ON THE PEACE OF CALLIAS

SAMUEL K. EDDY

WHETHER the Athenian ambassador Callias succeeded in making a formal peace between King Artaxerxes I and Athens around 449/8 B.C. has always been open to some doubt. The ancient writers who say that the treaty was concluded also make a number of inconsistent statements about its terms, and two men even deny that it was made at all. Some years ago, H. T. Wade-Gery attempted, successfully I believe, to explain and harmonize the discrepancies in the literary authorities and to outline the specific terms of peace which the two powers accepted. His original arguments were subsequently refined and defended by himself and by, among others, J. H. Oliver, A. Andrewes, and R. Meiggs. This position of those who think that the Peace of Callias was made is, in brief, as follows. After Cimon's decisive victory over the Persian fleet off Cyprus in around 450, the Persian King came to terms with the Athenians, and he recognized the autonomy of the Greek states in Asia Minor which had once been under Persian suzerainty. He also agreed that the troops at the disposal of his satraps would keep at a distance of three days' march (one day's horseback ride) from the coast, that is, to the eastward of a line a little to the west of Sardis. His naval forces would remain to the east of lines running through Phaselis and the Chelidonian Islands in the Mediterranean and through the Cyanean Rocks near the mouth of the Bosporus in the Black Sea. The Greeks, for their part, would keep their fleets to the westward of these two lines, would refrain from attacking or ravaging the King's territories, and would not fortify the cities in Asia Minor.[1]

Recently, the historicity of this peace has been challenged. R. Sealey, basing his case on the denials of Callisthenes and Theopompus that the treaty was ever made and on the inconsistencies in the other writers, rejected it, although he did think that a "Peace of Epilycus" was negotiated by Athens and Darius II in 424/3.[2] J. H. Oliver, in replying to some of Sealey's statements, considered the Peace of Callias authentic.[3] D. Stockton subsequently denied the existence not only of the Peace of Callias, but that of the "Peace of Epilycus" as well, and argued that Callias' treaty was really a forgery of the early fourth century.[4] His paper in turn provoked remarks in defense of both treaties by A. Andrewes and R. Meiggs.[5] The latter urged that since in one year, probably in 448, Athens collected no tribute from her allies, this fact considerably strengthened the case that a formal peace had been concluded. Unfortunately, the whole matter of the reality of the peace still seems not to be settled, so that it is the purpose of this paper to adduce more evidence that the Peace of Callias was in fact sworn, and to refute the assertions of Callisthenes and Theopompus that it was not.

1. H. T. Wade-Gery in *Athenian Studies Presented to W. S. Ferguson*, *HSCP*, Suppl. I (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 121–56, with a modification in B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, III (Princeton, 1949), 275 (hereafter cited as *ATL*). Wade-Gery's article was reprinted in his *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 201–32, to which the page numbers in these notes refer.

The résumé of the terms of the Peace of Callias is also based on the articles cited in notes 3 and 5, below.

2. R. Sealey, *Historia*, III (1954), 325–33.

3. J. H. Oliver, *Historia*, VI (1957), 254–55.

4. D. Stockton, *Historia*, VIII (1959), 61–73.

5. A. Andrewes, *Historia*, X (1961), 1–18; R. Meiggs, *HSCP*, LXVII (1963), 11–15.

The evidence that the treaty was made is the testimony of Diodorus (Ephorus), Plutarch, and several nearly contemporary orators of the fourth century.[6] I have little to add to what Wade-Gery, Andrewes, and Meiggs have said of it, except to stress the importance of one passage in Plutarch, which is based on the authority of the *Decrees* of Craterus. In the *Cimon* (13. 5) Plutarch says, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν, ἃ συνήγαγε Κρατερός, ἀντίγραφα συνθηκῶν ὡς γενομένων κατατέτακται. φασὶ δὲ καὶ βωμὸν εἰρήνης διὰ ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἱδρύσασθαι, καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν πρεσβεύσαντα τιμῆσαι διαφερόντως. ("Among the decrees, which Craterus collected, there is a copy of the treaty in its place as if it had really existed. They say also that the Athenians, because of it, set up an Altar of Peace and paid high honors to Callias, who had been ambassador.") The antecedents of φασὶ ("they say") must be Craterus and some other unnamed commentators like Harpocration or Philochorus. The high authority of Craterus is important evidence not only that there really was a treaty, but also that the Athenians celebrated it by raising an Altar of Peace and in some way publicly honoring Callias for his work. The nature of the honors paid him we learn from Pausanias, who saw and catalogued a commemoratory bronze statue of the ambassador standing near the Eponymous Heroes in the Agora at Athens.[7] We must assume, I think, that the Athenian *demos* did these things in the usual way, that is, by enacting and having engraved on stone *psephismata* ordering the altar to be built and Callias to be honored, and these inscriptions (or the copies of them in the Metroön) Craterus saw and copied.[8] If this is right, then those scholars who think that the stele on which the text of the treaty was engraved was a forgery, will have to admit, on the basis of the evidence in Craterus and Pausanias, that there were also a forged inscription authorizing Callias to be honored with a public statue, a forged inscription authorizing the building of the Altar of Peace, an undeserved, false statue, and an impious, false altar. One might entertain the notion that a single bogus inscription could be made and set up on the Acropolis (and a copy on wood or papyrus slipped into the official archives), but it is much harder to believe that a triple forgery of inscriptions and of archival copies was surreptitiously and successfully executed, and impossible to believe that an altar consecrating a nonexistent treaty and a statue honoring a diplomat for purely imaginary services

6. Diod. 12. 4. 4–6; Plut. *Cim.* 13. 5; Isoc. 4. 117–20; 7. 80; 12. 59; Dem. 15. 29; 19. 273–74; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 72–73.

7. Paus. 1. 8. 2. There is an obvious objection which might be made against the evidence given by Pausanias. One might accuse him of not really knowing what this ancient statue of Callias stood for. An Athenian Callias had won first prize in the pancratium at Olympia (Paus. 5. 9. 3; 6. 6. 1), and it might have been that the statue in Athens really commemorated the athlete and not the diplomat, and that Pausanias was misled by the local guide. On the other hand, if the base of the statue was inscribed to indicate why it had been set up, as it rather likely was, then Pausanias could not have been in error. A piece of the base of a statue with fragments of the names Callias and Calamis (a sculptor) has been found in the Agora at Athens (A. E. Raubitschek, *Dedications from the Athenian Acropolis* [Cambridge, Mass., 1949], No. 136 and p. 507). This piece of stone, however, probably came from a statue dedicated *by* Callias, not from one *of* him (G. M. A. Richter, *The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks*[3] [New Haven, 1950], p. 205; Hicks and Hill, *Sources for Greek History*[2] [Oxford, 1951], No. 32 [hereafter cited as *HH*[2]]).

8. Examples of similar official acts of the Athenian *demos* which have survived on stone are *IG*, I[2], 244+ = M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I[2], (Oxford, 1948), No. 40 (*ca.* 448 B.C.), which authorized the construction of the Temple of Athena Nike (hereafter cited as Tod, *GHI*). *IG*, I[2], 27 = *HH*[2], No. 34 (*ca.* 450 B.C.) honors certain men with a stele and special rights. *IG*, I[2], 54 = *ATL*, II, D 19 (*ca.* 435 B.C.) praises Pericles and his family. *IG*, I[2], 110+ = Tod, *GHI*, I[2], No. 86 (410/9 B.C.) honors Thrasybulus with a gold crown for benefits conferred upon the Athenian people.

It is possible that the decrees authorizing the altar and the statue were not engraved on stone, but merely written on the whitened boards that are mentioned in some inscriptions, and deposited in the archives. In view, however, of the relatively unimportant *psephismata*, like the proxeny decrees or the decrees mentioned above, which we know were engraved on stone at this prosperous time in Athenian history, it seems highly probable that *psephismata* celebrating a most important international agreement would have been engraved on marble and erected on the Acropolis.

could have been erected in full public view without thousands of Athenians knowing that everything was a hoax. And it was the sons of the men who saw the altar built who were the persons whom Isocrates and Demosthenes told that there had been a treaty.

There is another kind of unforgeable evidence that a peace was made. The states of the Delian Confederacy in Asia did in fact dismantle what fortifications were in existence before *ca.* 449/8. This must be so. Not only does Thucydides say that Ionia was unfortified in 427, but the truth of his statement has been confirmed by the lack of physical remains of heavy ringwalls, as ascertained by excavation and careful surface exploration of sites in the Troad, Ionia, and Caria.[9] It is impossible to conceive how all these states voluntarily and simultaneously in the second half of the fifth century decided to raze their walls without some sort of international agreement, and that agreement can only have been the Peace of Callias. We must acknowledge, therefore, that Callias did in fact negotiate a peace with Artaxerxes about 449 B.C.

Let us turn to the two ancient writers who said that there was no such peace. Plutarch paraphrases a statement made by the historian Callisthenes in which the latter categorically denies the existence of a treaty barring the Persians from approaching the Aegean more closely than a day's horseback ride or from sailing their ships west of the Chelidonian line.[10] Plutarch, however, places this denial of Callisthenes immediately after a description of the Greek victory in the Battle of Eurymedon in *ca.* 469, some twenty years earlier than the correct date of *ca.* 449 B.C.[11] Of course, Plutarch was not an expert in chronology, and he was occasionally guilty of gross carelessness on this score, so that this mistake may be his and not that of Callisthenes. Plutarch goes on, however, to paraphrase statements Callisthenes made to support his denial, namely, that Pericles with fifty ships and Ephialtes with thirty sailed east of the Chelidonians without sighting Persian warships. It must be that the date of Ephialtes' voyage was later than the supposed swearing of the treaty if Callisthenes' statement is to be pertinent. Ephialtes was, however, assassinated around 462, so that his cruise must have been made between *ca.* 469 and *ca.* 462. Therefore, the fact that Callisthenes mentioned the voyage of Ephialtes to defend his contention that the peace was not historical proves that Plutarch did not misunderstand the chronology of Callisthenes, and was not at fault in placing the latter's denial in the context of Eurymedon. It also shows that it was Callisthenes himself who was wrong in putting the alleged Peace of Callias soon after *ca.* 469 instead of after Cimon's victory off Cyprus.

It can be shown how Callisthenes made this mistake. Herodotus mentions in passing an Athenian Callias who led a diplomatic mission to Susa to negotiate with Artaxerxes.[12] Herodotus gives no details of the date of the embassy or of its purpose, because his main narrative is concerned with a contemporary Argive embassy to the King. The date of these two embassies is important to my argument, but, unfortunately, there is no concrete evidence of their exact date. E. M. Walker put them around 461 B.C.,

9. Thuc. 3. 33. 2; K. Schefold, *Arch. Anz.*, XLVIII (1933), 146–47; *Arch. Anz.*, XLIX (1934), 388–89; R. L. Scranton, *Greek Walls* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 175; G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA*, LII (1957), 61, 73, 94, 99, 104–5; H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1958), p. 219, n. 1.

10. Plut. *Cim.* 13. 4.

11. The absolute chronology is adopted from *ATL*, III, 158–80.

12. Hdt. 5. 151.

and in this was followed by Sealey.[13] I should be inclined, however, to think that both embassies were sent in 464/3, soon after the death of Xerxes I and the accession of Artaxerxes I. My reason is that the two Greek missions arrived in Susa at roughly the same time, and that, for this reason, some single event important to both states—one, Athens, at war with Persia, the other, Argos, neutral—must have been the cause of both embassies being sent. Such an event can only have been the accession of a new Great King. It would have been necessary for the Argives to learn whether Artaxerxes intended to keep his father's alliance with them, and for the Athenians to discover whether the new King was intent on pursuing his father's war with them. Callias' purpose, indeed, must almost certainly have been to discuss peace. No other business, seemingly, would have justified the dispatch of a body of diplomats to Susa at a time when the two states were at war. Callias must, on this view, have offered terms of some sort. The recent Greek victory at the Eurymedon gave Athens a strong position from which to bargain, and the increasing reluctance of some members of the Delian League to continue to furnish ships for a war which seemed unending, coupled with the revolt of Thasos and a growing suspicion that Sparta might intervene on her side, gave Athens good reasons to negotiate. Obviously, Artaxerxes told Callias that the war would go on, as we know it did, so that the ambassador returned without a treaty. The squadrons sent out by Athens under Pericles and Ephialtes were, in this context, the first Greek raids made after the failure of Callias' mission. And it was on *this* failure of around 464 that Callisthenes based his erroneous denial that the Peace of Callias was historical.

Callisthenes, then, was wrong about both the date and the result of the successful mission of Callias. He *may* have been wrong about a third matter of fact when he says that after Eurymedon the King's ships did not cross the Phaselis-Chelidonian line. I admit that I cannot prove him wrong, although there is one indication that the Persians may have come west of the line. Thucydides says that when Samos revolted in 440, a report reached Athens that the Persian ships were out and coming west. A small number of fast Athenian vessels were hurriedly sailed to waters off Caria to act as pickets. Not much later, after the Athenian victory off Tragia forced the Samian fleet into harbor, Pericles received a second urgent report, probably from the pickets, even though Thucydides does not say so specifically, that the Phoenician ships were still coming west. Pericles must have believed it, because he made the dangerous decision to reduce the number of triremes blockading the Samian fleet (with the result that the Samian warships drove the Athenians away for a time) and sailed eastward with sixty ships "in great haste."[14] Thucydides

13. E. M. Walker in *CAH*, V (Cambridge, 1927), 470; R. Sealey, *Historia*, III (1954), 151. Walker argued that these embassies must have been sent at a time when Argos was in danger from Sparta. "The date must therefore lie between 462 B.C., when the [Argive] alliance was formed with Athens, and 451 B.C., when the Thirty Years Truce was concluded [by Argos] with Sparta." This is not necessarily true. I should think it even more likely that the Argives would have been interested in knowing the King's attitude toward their projected alliance with Athens, a state then at war with Artaxerxes, so that the earlier date *ca.* 463 is to be preferred to *ca.* 461.

It is also worth pointing out that Argive fear of Sparta had been lessened at this time by the heavy losses of population Sparta suffered in the earthquake of *ca.* 464. On the other hand, there was tension between Argos and Corinth, probably over Cleonae, which had been an ally of Argos around 470 (Str. 8. 6. 19 [377]). Cleonae was attacked by Corinth, probably in the 460's (Plut. *Cim.* 17.1). No doubt as a result, a battle was certainly fought between Argos and Corinth, but the evidence for its date rests on the style of lettering in an inscription (*HH*^{2}, No. 110), and therefore it cannot be closely fixed (E. Kunze, *Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia*, II [Berlin, 1938], 68; III [Berlin, 1940], 76–78; E. Vanderpool, *AJA*, LXV [1961], 300). Paus. 2. 20. 1 may also refer to this engagement.

14. Thuc. 1. 116. 1, 3.

is vague as to Pericles' precise intentions, that is, whether he wished to seek battle with the King's ships or do something else. Thucydides says simply that he went "toward Caunus." Athens was nominally at peace with Persia, so that Pericles' aim may have been only to throw a force into unfortified Caunus to insure against the Persians seizing it, as Thucydides seems to imply. If so, when Pericles sailed in great haste toward the city, the Persians must have been already approximately on the Phaselis line, because Phaselis and Samos are roughly equidistant from Caunus.[15] The Persians must soon have turned back, however, doubtless when news reached them of the Athenian victory off Tragia, because there is no indication in any of our sources that the Athenian squadron made contact with them. If the Persians got a day or two to the west of Phaselis before turning back, then Callisthenes was guilty of a third mistake. In any event, I do not see how Callisthenes could find any reliable evidence in the Greek literature of the fifth century that the Persians *never* crossed the Phaselis line, so that his assertion they did not is simply that—pure assertion, and it must be that Callisthenes had some reason for making it.

We are justified in inferring from Callisthenes' two certain mistakes over the date and success of Callias' negotiations that he was grossly distorting the truth. According to the ancient traditions about him, he was not a trustworthy historian. While it is true that in one place Polybius calls him learned, that only means that Polybius regarded him as widely read, because in another place Polybius delivers a lengthy, detailed, and scathing denunciation of the accuracy of Callisthenes' description of the Battle of Issus, of which the man had been an eyewitness. Arrian says that Callisthenes was not only an egotist, who claimed that it was his books and not Alexander's victories which had made the conqueror's reputation, but also that Callisthenes was a man of poor judgment, a verdict with which Plutarch agreed.[16] We can see in a small way from some of the surviving fragments of Callisthenes' books how Arrian and Plutarch reached their opinions. In his *Deeds of Alexander*, an account of the famous campaign against Persia, Callisthenes invented supernatural events to show that the gods were on Alexander's side. Apollo's oracle at Didyma, silent since the time of Xerxes, spoke again when Alexander came to it, calling attention to the Macedonian's descent from Zeus and prophesying his victory at Gaugamela and the death of Darius III. The seas miraculously subsided before Alexander off Pamphylia. On the march to Siwah two crows accompanied the army, directing stragglers in the night back to the line of march by their cawing. Rain fell in the desert at the right moment to save the thirsty army, and so on.[17] The same taste for the supernatural disfigured Callisthenes' other major work, the *Hellenica*.[18] Since Callisthenes spread this sort of propaganda for Alexander's sake, it may well be that his false statements about Callias' failure to make peace were meant to magnify the achievements of his royal patron. Alexander conquered and overthrew the Great King in battle. The Greeks of the previous century had not even been able to make him come to terms. In view of all the foregoing, then, there is no reason to take seriously the denial of Callisthenes that Callias failed to make peace.

15. E. M. Walker, *CAH*, V (Cambridge, 1927), 470.

16. *FGrHist* 124 F 50 = Polyb. 6. 45. 1; F 35 = Polyb. 12. 5. 17–22; T 8 = Arr. *Anab.* 4. 10. 3; T 7 = Plut. *Alex.* 54. 1–2.

17. Didyma: *FGrHist* 124 F 14a = Str. 17. 1. 43 (814); seas: *ibid.*, F 31 = Schol. Eust. *Hom. Il.* 14. 29. Siwah: *ibid.*, F 14a = Str. 17. 1. 43 (814); F 14b = Plut. *Alex.* 27. 1. See, too, W. W. Tarn in *CAH*, VI (Cambridge, 1927), 398–99.

18. *FGrHist* 124 F 20 = Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 6. 26; F 21 = *ibid.* 7. 5. 3; F 22 = Cic. *Div.* 1. 74–76.

The other ancient writer who disbelieved in the treaty made a more subtle attack upon it. Theopompus must have seen a stele at Athens engraved with the text of the peace, because he noted that it was written in Ionic letters. Since this alphabet came into official use at Athens only in 403/2, and since the Attic epichoric alphabet was the only one employed for official inscriptions in the middle of the fifth century, he therefore denounced the stele as a fabrication.[19] This observation of Theopompus has played an important part in the modern controversy over the historicity of the peace. The authors of *ATL* attempted to explain it away by means of the hypothesis that only the introductory heading of the inscription was in Ionic letters, the original heading having been erased and a new one engraved when the peace of *ca.* 449/8 was resworn with Darius II in 424/3. Examples of such re-engravings are known.[20] Sealey was undoubtedly right, however, when he pointed out that *ATL* made Theopompus look unnecessarily foolish, because, after he had taken the trouble to find the inscription, he read no more than the introduction and did not trouble himself with the text.[21] One might go further than that and insist that Theopompus read through the whole text. A re-engraved heading would not have included the name of the eponymous archon for *ca.* 449/8, but the name of the archon of 424/3 instead, and it *might* not have included Callias' name as orator. Hence, Theopompus would have had to have read the whole text to be sure that he had before him the stone with the terms of Callias' alleged treaty. We may believe, then, that Theopompus read an inscription cut throughout in Ionic letters in its entirety. It would be easy to find an explanation for the existence of a stone engraved after 400 with a text dating from *ca.* 449/8. We might suppose that in 412 B.C., when Darius II entered the war against Athens as an ally of Sparta, the original stele was either officially or unofficially mutilated and smashed. After the war, the Athenians sentimentally re-engraved the text from the copy in the Metroön. We know of cases of inscriptions being recut for one reason or another.[22] I admit that there is no direct evidence that this was in fact done. But, if we must agree that the treaty was made, as I think we must, and, second, that Theopompus saw the text engraved in Ionic writing, then this would be the easiest explanation of the phenomena.

A most important aspect of Theopompus' argument is its extreme brevity. We have only the laconic citation from his book made by Harpocration to illustrate the phrase "in Attic letters," and from this we learn only that Theopompus denied the reality of the peace from the character of its letters. This denial was made before an audience undoubtedly familiar with the fact that public inscriptions had to be re-engraved. It is likely that a man as erudite as Theopompus had more than this one point to make. I submit that he also knew that there had been a number of armed clashes between Persia and the Delian League in violation of the treaty between 448 and 412. His sources of

19. *FGrHist* 115 F 154 = Harpocr., *s.v.* "Attikois grammasin."

20. *ATL*, III, 275–77. The parallels are *IG*, I², 52 + = Tod, *GHI*, I², No. 57 (treaty with Leontini); and *IG*, I², 51 + = Tod, *GHI*, I², No. 58 (treaty with Rhegium).

21. R. Sealey, *Historia*, III (1954), 328; D. Stockton, *Historia*, VIII (1959), 62.

22. Examples of re-engraved inscriptions would include the one which was part of the Athenian thank offering for Marathon erected at Delphi. The original of the early fifth century was recut, probably in the third century B.C.: Tod, *GHI*, I², No. 14. Similarly, the inscription recording the Athenian victory over Boeotia and Chalcis in the sixth century was re-engraved *ca.* 445 B.C.: Tod, *GHI*, I², Nos. 12 and 13. The best parallel would be the recutting of *IG*, I², 126 as *IG*, II², 1 + = Tod, *GHI*, I², No. 96, the decree of the Athenian democracy honoring the loyal Samians in 405, destroyed almost certainly by the Thirty in 404, and re-erected by the restored democracy in about 403.

knowledge would have included several books written in the fifth century which now are lost, like the *Atthis* of Hellanicus, the *Hypomnemata* of Ion of Chios, and the *Hellenica* and *Persica* of Charon of Lampsacus, as well as lost and surviving Athenian inscriptions similar to *IG*, I^2, 97+, which authorized a military expedition of around 430 B.C.[23]

There is certain evidence that fighting between Athens and the Persians did take place soon after *ca.* 449/8. D. Stockton called attention to a passage in Plutarch's *Pericles* which must have to do with incidents later than 449, because the construction of the Parthenon, begun in 447, and of other Attic temples is under way. In this passage, certain opponents of Pericles complain that the treasure of the Delian Confederacy is being kept in Athens, although the money in it had been contributed by the many allied states. Thus, Athens is behaving like a tyrant, and is using the allies' money not to fight "the barbarians" (*sc.*, "Persians"), but to decorate herself like a harlot with temples worth a thousand talents. To this Pericles replies that Athens is not called upon to render an account of the use of these funds, "since she is fighting for the allies against the barbarians," and because the allies are not contributing soldiers, like Athens, but only cash. Stockton rightly insisted that the present tenses in these lines be noted, forcing us to believe that military operations of some sort were going on.[24] We know, moreover, of four certain incidents in which the Persians clearly violated the terms of the treaty. In 440, Pissuthnes, the satrap at Sardis, sent 700 mercenaries west of the Sardis line to help Samos revolt from Athens. He also imprisoned Athenian prisoners taken from the island. In 430, he again sent soldiers into the Greek sphere to assist the anti-Athenian faction at Colophon to rebel, and in 427 he brought about an attack on Notium, right on the shores of the Aegean. Sometime between 431 and 425 Caunus rose against Athens, and she must have done so with Persian assistance.[25] Now, some modern scholars, like Sealey and Stockton, have interpreted these incidents as evidence that no treaty had been sworn, on the ground that when there is warfare there has been no formal peace. Even Wade-Gery, who believed in the historicity of the Peace of Callias, called Pissuthnes' intervention in 440 a mere strain to which the treaty was subjected, and the authors of *ATL*, who also believed in the treaty's existence, thought that Artaxerxes in 440 only considered breaking the treaty.[26] But this interpretation of the facts is naïve, because it is based on the assumption that if a peace were agreed to, both sides would scrupulously observe it. There is no more reason to believe that Greeks and Persians would keep a treaty than that Athens and Sparta would faithfully observe the Fifty Years Treaty of 421 B.C. That treaty we know was broken within three years.[27] Therefore, it was, I suggest, a knowledge of these four, and possibly other, incidents in violation of the Peace of Callias, taken in connection with the Ionic lettering of the inscription, which led the Athenophobic Theopompus of Chios wrongly to denounce the treaty as a forgery.

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23. Text and date of this inscription from B. D. Meritt, *Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson* (St. Louis, 1951), II, 298–303.

24. D. Stockton, *Historia*, VIII (1959), 69. The passage is Plut. *Per.* 12. 1–3. Stockton used this passage to argue that since there had been fighting at some time shortly after 449, when this debate took place, there had been no treaty *ca.* 449. But he went on to say (p. 70), that the Athenians made a decision *ca.* 449 to suspend active hostilities with Persia. He cannot have the argument both ways. If Pericles says "we are fighting the barbarians," then what reason is there to think that hostilities were over?

25. Samos: Thuc. 1. 116. 1–3; Colophon: Thuc. 3. 34. 1–2; Notium: Thuc. 3. 34. 2–4; Caunus: Ctes. *Pers. epit.* 43. Ctesias says that Zopyrus, a Persian notable living in exile at Athens, was killed by a Caunian when Athens attacked the rebellious state. Since the slayer of Zopyrus was subsequently executed by the Persians themselves, it must be that the Persians had great influence, that is, soldiers, in Caunus, and, for that reason, it is likely that they took part in her original secession.

26. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 221–22; *ATL*, III, 307–8.

27. The Treaty was made in 421 (Thuc. 5. 22. 1–23. 2) and, already in 418 Athenian and Spartan troops fought on opposite sides in the Battle of Mantinea (Thuc. 5. 74. 1–2).